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ii 
 
No face which we can give to a matter will stead us so well at last as the truth. This alone 
wears well. For the most part, we are not where we are, but in a false position. Through an 
infinity of our natures, we suppose a case, and put ourselves into it, and hence are in two cases at 
the same time, and it is doubly difficult to get out. In sane moments we regard only the facts, the 
case that is. Say what you have to say, not what you ought. Any truth is better than make-believe. 
Tom Hyde, the tinker, standing on the gallows, was asked if he had anything to say. "Tell the 
tailors," said he, "to remember to make a knot in their thread before they take the first stitch." His 
companion's prayer is forgotten…. 
- Henry Thoreau: Walden 
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ABSTRACT 
There is no shortage of threats to an individual’s privacy in the contemporary 
world. At any time, it is possible for any citizen to be subjected to an invasion of their 
personal privacy in a number of different ways. In this thesis I outline three differing 
perspectives from which society can view issues pertaining to individual privacy. Using 
differing political theories as advocates of each perspective, I analyze the logical results 
and the effects each perspective has on society at large. Whichever perspective we adopt 
has great influence over legislative discretion, legal rules, and executive authority when 
issues of privacy arise.   The influence a society has when adopting one perspective of 
privacy permits and restricts certain government actions. For example, our contemporary 
perspective of privacy as an interest that is only valuable to the extent that it can be sold, 
illustrates to authorities that all that is required to invade someone’s privacy is sufficient 
compensation. Through my analysis, I find that the perspective of privacy viewed by the 
Classical Republican tradition is best in most circumstances, and that it is best for any 
society to maintain the broadest political view.
1 
CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION 
There is no shortage of threats to an individual’s privacy in the contemporary 
world. It is possible for any citizen, at any time, to be subjected to a number of different 
types of invasions, including, but not limited to, the recording of phone calls and email 
content, collection of information regarding internet, shopping, or library history, 
tracking of geographic location, and even more physical and present invasions by the 
police such as those referred to as “stop and frisk” searches. There is also a great 
possibility that actions taken on the part of private corporations would be considered 
invasions of privacy and are just as ubiquitous as the invasive actions of the state. Many 
of these private entities maintain a prodigious influence over the general population, 
simply because of the way navigating life in modern society is so dependent upon 
technologies created by private enterprise.   Examples of this include building and 
maintaining online profiles, not only of those who participate willingly, as well as 
listening in on private conversations and electronic messages whether on an individual’s 
phone, computer, or novel, in-home “virtual assistants.”  
 Today, many people dismiss any claim about the detriments of invasions of 
privacy, especially when the threat of invasion or insurgence is posed by the government. 
For some unlucky few, those detriments become unignorably painful. Take the case of 
Xiaxing Xi. Xi is a Chinese-born American Citizen and former chair of Temple 
University’s Physics Department.  
 
 
2 
While conducting research at the University, Xi “managed nine government 
research projects and more than a million dollars in federal funding, including grants 
from the National Science Foundation.”1 Additionally, he was responsible for working 
collaboratively with Chinese scientists. That is, until the FBI covertly surveilled his 
online interactions in his research. Information gathered without a warrant led to a 
suspicion that he was “scheming to obtain groundbreaking American technology” and 
passing those trade secretes on to scientists in China. 
The pounding on his front door was so intense that Xiaoxing Xi opened it 
without being fully dressed. In the early morning light on the other side, a dozen 
armed FBI agents, clad in bullet-proof vests, barged into Xi's home with their 
guns drawn. They pushed him against a wall and handcuffed him as his wife and 
daughters looked on, frightened and confused. They had a warrant for his arrest, 
the agents explained, but did not tell him why. Instead, they whisked him away to 
an FBI field office where they eventually told him he faced charges related to 
economic espionage…2 
 
In addition to the severe charges against him, Xi’s reputation was ruined, as he was 
quickly labeled an international spy by the media, stripped of his research responsibilities 
and shunned from his work and colleagues. What the FBI thought they had surveilled Xi 
doing, giving away valuable trade secrets, is considered “economic espionage”, and a 
federal offense. After enduring weeks of stress and the looming threat of life-ruining 
charges against him, the government dropped the case against Xi after the defense was 
able to easily prove that his actions were not espionage at all. In fact his cooperation with 
his Chinese colleagues was harmless and actually part of his mandate from the National 
Science Foundation. The charges were entirely baseless, but they cost Xiaxing Xi 
immensely.  
                                                 
1
 Brit Farmer, “The Spy Who Wasn’t,” 60 Minutes, August 26, 2018,  
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-spy-who-wasnt/. 
2
 Farmer. 
3 
Intrusions into privacy such as this case were sanctioned and continue to happen 
not least because of value judgements about privacy. Modern evaluations of privacy 
indicate that in many cases privacy is considered to be unimportant, superfluous, or 
negligible. The objective of this thesis is to show that there are many ways in which we 
can evaluate privacy and that some of our contemporary evaluations are inadequate.  
One cannot refute that privacy and privacy rights were, at one point, a defining 
characteristic of Western society. It seems that recent events and revolutions have shifted 
our perspective. For example, because of the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center, 
Americans have adapted and changed many aspects of their lives out of fear. The 
repercussions of that tragic event have impacted every American in some way. Decisions 
were made and policies have been put into action to ensure, as least as much as humanly 
possible, that another similar attack never again takes place on American soil. In order to 
better protect and respond to the threats of terrorism we created the Department of 
Homeland Security to keep watch of our borders, upgraded and enhanced the strategies of 
the National Security Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 
adopted new foreign policies that announced to the world that any nation that supports 
terrorist organizations is an enemy of the United States. 
Legislative acts and executive orders were designed and carried out with the 
objective of keeping Americans safe from terrorists and reducing crime. However, the 
policies have had a very unfortunate side effect in that many of the provisions passed are 
dubious as to their constitutionality and many individuals believe that they represent a 
rather large government overreach into the realm of infringement upon civil liberties. 
With support from a vast majority of the legislature and the President’s executive orders, 
4 
government agencies produced new programs that would surveille amazing portions of 
internet and telephone communications and collect enormous amounts of data, not just 
apropos to suspicious foreign targets, but everyone.
3
 
Convinced of the need for greater information about potential threats, US 
government agents have spied, eavesdropped, hacked, infiltrated, seized, maimed, and 
tortured, all on behalf of the American people. Many of these techniques have been 
aimed at Americans themselves for fear of criminals, terrorists, and terrorist sympathizers 
hiding amongst the general population. Thanks to whistleblowers within government 
agencies, people who believed many of the actions carried out to be a violation of rights 
and an affront to morality, we now know that the NSA collects nearly all electronic data 
including phone calls, website visits, and email content. It employs an unknown number 
of super computers and data collection experts to collect, sift, and sort through all of the 
data,
4
 without a warrant and previously unbeknownst to the individual user. We also 
know that any action taken online or with a connected device is subject to scrutiny and 
recording.
5
 We know that police can stop any person on the street and begin an 
investigation into their history and that the concept of probable cause is on the verge of 
dissolution.
6
  
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Michael Kirk, “United States of Secrets,” Frontline (Arlington, VA: PBS, May 13, 2014), 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/united-states-of-secrets/. 
4
 David C. Gray, The Fourth Amendment in an Age of Surveillance (Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 4. 
5
 Gray, The Fourth Amendment in an Age of Surveillance. 
6
 Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Dissenting Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (U.S. Supreme Court 2016). 
5 
What is unknown to us is how much more secure Americans are because of the 
heightened level of surveillance, how many attacks have been stopped, how many lives 
have been saved thanks to our government’s willingness to “take the gloves off”7 and do 
what is necessary to protect its citizens. However, we can evaluate the perspectives of 
government officials and those Americans who support the maintenance and use of their 
sweeping security program. Upon evaluation, laws like the Patriot Act, the USA Freedom 
Act, or private corporate policies that delve into the thoughts and relationships of 
individuals, may be found to steal away the privacy rights of every American before 
we’ve had the chance to fully understand the effects of what we are doing.  
An examination of modern government policies has illuminated the lengths that 
we are willing to go to create a sense of security and realized what were once extreme 
hypothetical circumstances.
8
 General public trends show a lack of concern towards the 
protection of privacy and civil liberties and, instead, a greater concern for public safety. 
These trends and policies reveal a critical necessity to effectively and rightly weigh the 
importance of privacy. There are many ways in which we can view privacy. The fervent 
decent that arises before the passage of public policies regarding privacy is a testament to 
that fact. The primary question in contention in this thesis then is, which theoretical 
perspective is best for evaluating privacy issues? 
 
The following work is neither an argument against the governments duty to 
protect its citizens, although arguments have been made as to legal and moral limits on 
                                                 
7
 Andrew Buncombe and Anne Penketh, “Rumsfeld ‘Told Officers to Take Gloves off with Lindh,’”  
The Independent, June 10, 2004, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/rumsfeld-told-
officers-to-take-gloves-off-with-lindh-731644.html. 
8
 Charles Fried and Gregory Fried, Because It Is Wrong: Torture, Privacy and Presidential Power in the 
Age of Terror (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2010), 23. 
6 
the measures that may be taken against an insurrection or foreign enemy,
9
 nor is it a 
defense of criminal or terrorist activity. Rather, it is a statement about the importance of 
individual privacy in every person’s life, and in every society. My objective is to show 
that there are many ways in which we can evaluate privacy and that the contemporary 
lens through which we view issues of privacy is inadequate. There is a better perspective. 
                                                 
9
 “Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” Title 9, 
Chapter IV of United Nations Treaties. vol. 1465 (1987). 
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CHAPTER 2.    A METHOD FOR REDISCOVERING THE PRIVATE REALM 
In order to carry out an investigation into which theoretical perspective is best, it 
will be necessary to examine the works of philosophers and policy proponents who hold 
vastly different perspectives of privacy. Therefore, this work will discuss a political 
debate that encompasses arguments made by several political philosophers including 
Hanna Arendt, Charles and Gregory Fried, Alan Westin, Jeffrey H. Reiman, Richard 
Posner, and H. Mark Roelofs. A few of these philosophers have made great attempts to 
carry the meaning of privacy from the ancient world that established our political 
foundations into the modern world. Delving into the debate that is illustrated by these 
philosophers will reveal the foundations of a conflict that is a fundamental part of our 
history as a democracy. It is a conflict that stems from competing values at the core of 
Western culture. The arguments made by a number of these philosophers will reveal a 
greater meaning within privacy than what is often understood, and why privacy should 
remain an important aspect of citizenship in a Western Democracy.  
All the works presented in this thesis were chosen because they offer unique 
points of view. Some focus specifically on privacy, others simply provide an account of 
social phenomena that implicates individual liberties. No two arguments are the same. 
Many of the works used to support these arguments were selected because they are 
viewed as seminal works on privacy, like Alan Westin’s Privacy and Freedom. As a 
former President of the Center for Social & Legal Research, Westin lends a unique and 
nearly comprehensive view of privacy in the 1960’s. The book has been cited in 
thousands of related articles and was influential in persuading legislative enactments 
following its publication. 
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Because Westin’s book is so comprehensive, it begins with a discussion of 
evidence for privacy that can be found in animal biology and the study of pre-civilized 
man. Westin then transitions into descriptions of privacy in increasingly modern 
societies. It is this section in which he begins to cite the accounts of academics who have 
studied the philosophies of ancient societies such as Greece and Rome in order to get a 
better understanding of their view of privacy. Westin cites Hannah Arendt and H. Mark 
Roelofs, among others, as prominent scholars in this field.  
A parallel reading of both Arendt and Roelofs shows that they share a similar 
account of Greek and, to some extent, Roman society. From this account I have derived 
what I would call an ancient understanding of privacy and the principles regarding it. In 
order to compare and contrast perspectives that are different from this ancient account, I 
searched for literature that makes arguments about privacy, independent of the influence 
of ancient traditions; arguments that can only be perceived as reflective of the morals and 
values of the time and society in which they were written.  
One volume of an academic journal appeared continuously throughout my search 
for moral arguments regarding privacy; that is the summer volume of Philosophy & 
Public Affairs, 1975. In this journal three philosophers give their accounts of why privacy 
is important and make compelling arguments against each other’s interpretations. These 
three articles also meet the demands required to be supportive of the arguments made 
here, in that all of them support reasons for why they believe privacy is important without 
reference to earlier accounts of privacy, and they are widely regarded as arguments that 
are difficult to refute; accepted as veracious accounts of privacy and the principles 
concerning it. 
9 
In juxtaposition, none of the accounts mentioned here hold privacy in the same 
esteem or consideration as much of modern society. What I mean here is that portions of 
American society can clearly be perceived as holding privacy to be an unimportant 
principle to say the least, and a simple proof of that can be found in legislation and court 
rulings about privacy. If the considerations of the court were entirely outlandish, or 
legislation passed by congress was considered to be overbearing or egregiously 
ineffective, those public policies would not stand long in a representative political 
system. Consequently, I set out to find academic, credible accounts of this contemporary 
understanding of privacy, accounts that match up well and defend the stance on privacy 
rights that is taken by modern public policy. In doing so, Author and Judge Richard 
Posner came to my attention several times as an advocate of national security and law 
enforcement schemes that seem to hold privacy in this light. Posner’s book Not a Suicide 
Pact, while not his most famous publication, addresses this balance between security and 
privacy most directly.  
Finally, the last accounts I’d like to mention are those of former U.S. Attorney 
General John Ashcroft and former Intelligence Director Michael Hayden. In their 
publications, there is a vivid and real account of the balancing act that policy makers 
must take on when maintaining national security. Taken together, they reveal the values 
and judgments that have be weighed and present a cohesive argument for their beliefs 
about privacy and why contemporary policies regarding privacy look the way they do. 
Accordingly, a reading of the literature in this manner supposes three apparent 
theoretical perspectives about privacy.  In light of this realization, I have grouped similar 
appeals together so that they form a cohesive argument for each perspective. We can then 
10 
evaluate each perspective based upon the appeals made by its supporting theorists. The 
first perspective I will call the Participatory Democratic perspective. It is defended by 
particular comments and sections of Arendt and Roelofs works regarding civic life in 
ancient democracies. Their works were chosen because they represent the best arguments 
for a view of privacy as important for a vibrant public and a plurality of ideas. They write 
from an approach that stresses the importance of civic virtue, as well as the importance of 
the traditional understanding of republicanism.  A second perspective is defended by late 
modern philosophers, such as Westin and Rachels who were writing in response the 
newly rediscovered question of privacy and liberty in the 50’s and 60’s. Their perspective 
I will call the American Liberal perspective. These works were chosen because of the 
logical appeals they make for the importance of privacy for the individual. They make 
compelling arguments that are opposed to the Participatory Democratic perspective and 
are different, in that their focus is on the individual rather than the public as a whole.  
As we will see, these accounts both stand in contrast to the third perspective, the 
Contemporary account of privacy. Current government officials and policies do not 
reflect an espousal of the view of privacy that was held in foundational Western thought 
or in traditional Liberal thought. The major advocate of this perspective in the following 
work is Justice Richard A. Posner. His appeals were chosen to defend the Contemporary 
perspective because he is a zealous advocate of many public policies that maintain a 
similar evaluation of privacy, and his publication on the topic offers clear and compelling 
arguments for his view of privacy issues in the modern world.  
Although the invasions of privacy that are asserted here take place in the 
contemporary world, they are exemplary of an ancient debate, at least as old as the 
11 
concept of democracy, between the individual and the nation, between order and 
freedom, and between security and liberty. The debate about the correct interpretation of 
the meaning of privacy, or its importance, is a theoretical one. It cannot be won by a 
survey of public opinion, nor can the value of any one perspective be evaluated through 
statistical analysis. Thus, the methodology for examining each philosophical aspect of 
privacy must remain philosophical. The technique used for unraveling this conflict 
between security and privacy is historical prescription, a logical technique given that the 
conflict itself has been handed down through our inheritance of Western Culture. The 
examination here mirrors the traditionalist approach of its predecessors, Roelofs and 
Arendt, who in turn have searched for solutions to this, and similarly persistent problems, 
in the wisdom of philosophers who have come before.  
There are many questions implicated in this investigation that are extremely 
difficult or impossible to answer. While we can look at differing theories about the 
importance of privacy, this thesis does not answer questions about the effectiveness of 
modern security policies. Not only are questions of this sort out of the scope of my thesis, 
but they would require more information than is available, considering the secretive 
nature of national security information. Additionally, questions of constitutionality are 
not within the scope of this thesis. For reasons which I will explain, our scope in the 
investigation is much wider.  
12 
CHAPTER 3.    LITERATURE REVIEW 
The circumstances that bring contention to this debate take place within the 
sphere of American public policy, but privacy protections have been, historically, a 
source of dispute far before the inception of America. Any academic work discussing the 
right to privacy in the United States will likely begin with a similar statement as “the US 
Constitution makes no mention of a right to privacy.” Some may even use this 
observation to support an argument that there is no right to privacy there, or that any 
claims Americans have to a right that may well look like privacy are really rooted in 
private property rights and claims to ownership and possession.
1
 However, I dispute this 
argument, and I believe that this portion of the privacy debate is settled. Americans do, in 
fact, have a right to privacy and, although not always protected by judicial interpretations 
of their Constitution, rights to privacy are recognized and enforced by a number of 
government institutions.  
The Supreme Court made no mention of a right to privacy until 1965
2
, but moral 
standards for protecting individual privacy can be found in laws dating back to 
revolutionary America. According to Daniel J. Solove, a prominent legal scholar on 
privacy, “Even in the early days of colonial America, there was some limited legal 
protection of privacy,” citing the English law against eavesdropping.3 He also provides 
that, in 1782, Congress passed a law prohibiting the opening of mail by unassociated 
                                                 
1
 Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The Right to Privacy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 4, no. 4 (1975): 299. 
Thomson’s thought provoking discussion attempts to narrow what exactly privacy is, and, while helpful, 
misses a defining point, as I will note in an impending paragraph. 
2
 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
3
 Daniel J. Solove 2006. "A Brief History of Information Privacy Law," In Proskauer on Privacy, 1-46. 
(New York City: Practicing Law Institute), 4.  
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persons.
4
 In 1891, the Supreme Court ruled that courts cannot compel individuals to 
submit their bodies for intrusion by surgical examination, creating a common law to 
protect the “inviolability of the person.”5 And, in modern times they have laws protecting 
a person’s financial identity, as well as their health records, and even the marks earned in 
grade school. All of these point to a legitimate regard for respecting an individual’s 
privacy without any appeal to a constitutionally guaranteed right, and so, to make the 
statement that Americans do not have a right to privacy, simply because the constitution 
does not articulate one, would be unfounded.  
It is also unfounded to say that privacy is simply an extension of property rights; a 
common argument. I agree with American Philosopher Thomas Scanlon that privacy 
rights are not “a cluster of diverse rights […] each of them in fact a right of some other 
kind, e.g. a right of ownership,” rather they are individual claims against some particular 
circumstances of feeling a certain violation, all with a common foundation in the interests 
we have in “being able to be free from certain kinds of intrusions.”6 As the following 
discussion will illustrate, while it is easy to settle a debate about whether or not we have a 
singular specific right to privacy, it is much more difficult to define or conceptualize 
what exactly privacy is. 
Another common introduction to an academic work regarding privacy in the 
United States is to begin with an allusion to the work of Justices Lewis and Brandeis, 
published in the Harvard Law Review 1890.
7
 It was, and continues to be, hailed as a 
touchstone of privacy law in America, and the article, coupled with his famous dissent in 
                                                 
4
 Solove, "A Brief History of Information Privacy Law," 6. 
5
 Ibid, 9. 
6
 Thomas Scanlon, “Thomson on Privacy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 4, no. 4 (1975): 315. 
7
 Samuel D. Warren, Louis D. Brandeis. “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4, no. 5 (Dec. 15, 
1890): 193-220. 
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Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), has caused many legal scholars to dub 
Brandeis the father of American privacy law. Titled The Right to Privacy, the review is 
periodically recalled as a reminder that the law ought to grow to meet the unpredictable 
circumstances of human life, and as a reminder that, while many aspects of our lives 
stretch beyond the tangible world, the law ought to, in accordance with the virtue of 
justice, seek to remedy even those transgressions which cannot be said to leave a physical 
impression.  
In making the case for the protection of the individual, the authors provide moral 
reasoning against invasions of privacy that are difficult to refute: 
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have 
rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining 
influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and 
privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and 
invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain 
and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.
8
  
The article provides a more than adequate argument for a change in tort law in the US, 
and it is probably not as abrasive towards the offenses of “the refining influences of 
culture” as many modern invasions of privacy would justify. Without detracting from the 
work of Lewis and Brandeis, it is important to note that the Justices did not create a right 
to privacy in the US; privacy predates them. Nor did they necessarily refer to the same 
particular type of privacy that is pertinent here. Rather, they reproved the courts because, 
as it so often does, the law failed to keep up with the necessities of human affairs. In 
making this observation they have dichotomized the right to privacy so that we may 
recognize, not only forced intrusions by the government, but intrusions made by 
                                                 
8
 Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 196. 
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individuals, the former made culpable in the United States by the Bill of Rights, the latter 
by the evolution of tort law. 
 This dichotomy of privacy law, laws that protect Americans from invasions made 
by private individuals and those made by state institutions, make up the entirety of 
privacy protections in the US. Contemporary policy makers, like Richard Posner, who 
argue on behalf of the powers of government will often attempt to trivialize these rights 
to privacy. They will state that the right to privacy is nothing more than, “constitutional 
rights, created by the Supreme Court without any basis in constitutional text, to use 
contraceptives, to have an abortion, and to engage in homosexual sex.”9 In the 
contemporary world, the heightened perception of threats to public safety and national 
security make it very easy to discount perceptions that greatly value privacy. 
However, an understanding of privacy as simply an amalgam of reproductive 
rights is a far too narrow conception for our discussion here, so too is an understanding of 
privacy that would halt at the protection of one’s filing cabinet or brief case or familiar 
conversations. Understandably, these may be small individual parts of one’s conception 
of privacy, however, as we will see, it is often thought to be so fundamentally intertwined 
with the concept of individual liberty that an attempt to list the circumstances in which a 
person may be afforded some degree of privacy would be endless; because, simply put, 
“the right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.”10
                                                 
9
 Richard Posner, Not a Suicide Pact (Oxford University Press, 2006), 127. 
10
 Justice William O. Douglas, Dissenting, Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (U.S.  
Supreme Court 1952): 451. Emphasis added 
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The Participatory Democratic Perspective 
For those who are familiar with her work, it would seem quite contradictory to 
wish to define a perspective of privacy and begin with Arendt. The Human Condition is 
most often used as the scripture for political action, mankind’s life in the public. 
However, Arendt commences her inquiry into the roots of contemporary politics through 
etymological analysis, a common method among philosophers, and a useful tool to 
decipher meaning. Her process leads her to make several distinctions in political 
philosophy, so as to distinguish what are original meanings from those attributed in the 
synthesis of language, to define and refine what our specific concept is not, so all that is 
left is, what is. In her distinctions between the public life and the private life, and labor, 
work, and action, a glimpse into the ancient understanding of privacy may be revealed. In 
order to make clear these distinctions, Arendt exemplifies the ancient political life of the 
Greeks who, during the short life of their Athenian democracy, immortalized themselves 
through politics alone. 
Arendt’s account of Aristotle tells with historical accuracy that the original Greek 
understanding of politics has been deformed and partially lost in translation. As she 
states, “the early translation of Aristotle’s zōon politikon by animal socialis, [is] already 
found in Seneca, which then became standard translation through Thomas Aquinas: homo 
est naturaliter politicus, id est, socialis (man is by nature political, that is, social).”1 Her 
reasoning is that if we are to understand the origin of our values it will be important to 
know how our ancestors in the Western world felt about them. The forefathers of our 
Western philosophy have innocently misused the world “social” in this context, because 
as Arendt reminds us, the Greeks had no word for the concept. In their quintessential 
                                                 
1
 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 23. 
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architype for Western Democracy, the political life, rather than a social life, for the 
Greeks, bios politikos, was the life par excellence. 
The political life for the Greeks, according to Arendt, is characterized as the realm 
in human life where action and speech take place, a public realm, “the realm of human 
affairs,” called such because action and speech were regarded as the “highest of all 
human capacities,” and capacities that are distinctly human.2 These capacities necessitate 
a political realm, that is, a plurality of men, insofar as neither speech nor action can be 
done in solitude. In contrast, all other capacities that can be performed by humans, are 
either not distinctly human, meaning they are not unique to our species, such as 
procreation or nourishment, or they can be done in solitude, such as contemplation. 
Action and speech are elevated to this level of dignity because they constitute a way of 
life that is free of all biological necessity or animalistic dependence.
3
 In Arendt’s 
understanding of the Greek political culture, the political life within the public realm 
represented an opportunity to rise above the necessities of biological life, and the 
prepolitical despotism of family life, to a life of greater meaning in purely, free human 
action. 
Standing in direct contrast to, and the only concept reaffirming the existence of, 
the political life, is the private life; the diametrically corresponding form of living that is 
rooted in the household and the family. If we hold that the truly defined requirement for 
the existence of a public realm is a plurality of men, then it logically follows that its 
opposite, the private realm, should be defined by a lack of this plurality. The fact that the 
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word “private” quite literally means “to be deprived” strikes Arendt as significant, as she 
says, “to live an entirely private life means above all to be deprived of things essential to 
a truly human life: to be deprived of the reality that comes from being seen and heard by 
others.”4 Given the plurality of men necessary to form the public realm and the individual 
perspectives that each one holds, the public realm carries within it a peculiar ability to 
continuously reaffirm the reality of the world for those who share and participate in it. 
“Since our feeling for reality depends utterly upon appearance […] something that is 
being seen and heard by others as well as ourselves – constitutes reality.”5  These 
defining characteristics were true of the public and the private in their original 
understanding and continue to hold true today.
6
   
If the public realm reaffirms the reality of our world in common, then the private 
realm offers an escape from it. As Arendt describes it, the private realm offers men “their 
place in the world […] their private home, where they once felt sheltered against the 
world and where […] even those excluded from the world [women and slaves] could find 
a substitute in the warmth of the hearth and the limited reality of family life.”7 The 
organization of ancient gens into a citizenry of the city-state was the impetus for the rise 
of the public realm. However, the significance of this newly founded public life did not 
destroy the necessity for a primordial private life, rather it reaffirmed it.  
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The private area of life in an ancient Democracy was considered sacred, and a 
respect for it led to the creation of a physical structure
8
 that protects men from the 
sterilizing light of unwanted publicity while simultaneously anchoring them to a fixed 
place in the world of human affairs. Within this sacred arena, free of public supervision 
or outside intrusion, each man ruled in absolute based on the hierarchical regime of the 
family. Arendt alludes to a man’s ability to master his own life and decide for himself 
what will be done because of “the power with which the paterfamilias, the dominus, ruled 
over his household of slaves and family.”9 The ancient regimes of the private world and 
of the public world are thus exactly opposites, a diametric relationship important for our 
understanding because no concept can be understood without observation of its opposite.  
The home has one singular ruler, under whom is a man’s wife, slaves, and 
children. The household was characterized as a single unit that shared the identity of the 
patriarch and was indistinguishable from him. Being devoid of freedom, household 
members did not deviate from a patriarch’s perception. The household was also 
characterized as safe, comfortable, and knowable; a side effect of the strict hierarchy of 
power and the lack of freedom for the individual household member.
10
  Conversely, a 
public has no such hierarchy, rather it is made of a select few equals who, each 
representing their own unique perspective, are individuals and distinguished their 
individuality through acts of free will and the performance of great deeds.
11
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Arendt supports a theory that a strong political realm, where great deeds can 
occur, requires a protected private realm. An example of such support is her discussion of 
the ancient idea of private property, which “played at least formally, more or less the 
same role as the chief condition for admission to the public realm and full-fledged 
citizenship.”12 In the ancient world, a private place of one’s own, that is recognized  and 
respected by all others,  is a necessary precursor to, not only the individuals citizenship, 
but also, because the public realm is made entirely of individual citizens, to the existence 
of a public realm.  
A satisfied private life is a necessary precursor to an individual’s public life 
because, as Arendt says, “our private possessions, which we use and consume daily, are 
much more urgently needed than any part of the common world”13 and later goes on to 
state, 
from the beginning of history to our own time it has always been the bodily part 
of human existence that needed to be hidden in privacy, all things connected with 
the necessity of the life process itself, which prior to the modern age 
comprehended all activities serving the subsistence of the individual and the 
survival of the species.
14
 
In the ancient world and leading up to the Middle Ages, those who did not have a private 
life that was properly satisfying were considered to be no more than a slave.
15
 Because 
the part of life that takes place in one’s private home is meant to fulfill the biological 
necessities of human life, when it does not, man is required by nature, enslaved by nature, 
to spend his time with work and toil in order to sustain himself. In spending this time, he 
has none left to participate in public life, to experience the most dignified of human 
capacities, or to know the freedom that is realized in fulfilled citizenship. 
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The concept of a fully rewarding citizenship is the subject of analysis for H. Mark 
Roelofs, Professor Emeritus of New York University and co-founder of the Caucus for a 
New Political Science. In a similar vein to Arendt, Roelofs attempts to find meaning in an 
examination of the ancient societies that inspired Western Democracy and seeks the 
original meaning of citizenship in order to “erect a new, more adequate exposition and 
defense of the concept.”16 He finds his desired meaning, not in the definition of the word 
citizenship, but in the emotions that it elicits. His observation of the word tells us that, 
beyond its purely descriptive content, we often attribute greater meaning to citizenship 
because it connotes feelings of pride, loyalty, and defiance. These extra-descriptive 
meanings each make up a different part of Citizenship, but all three form its conception in 
Western Democracy. Roelofs’ examination reveals that each emotional meaning is rooted 
in a traditional understanding of what citizenship meant to one of the individual societies 
that are the progenitors of our democracy, the foundations of our modern concept of 
citizenship. 
Roelofs, like Arendt, also begins with an examination of Ancient Greece. In his 
understanding, the root of our pride in citizenship arises from its connection to the Greeks 
and the Periclean Ideal. Pride is probably the easiest emotion to relate to the word 
citizenship in the U.S. As Roelofs states, “we can imagine a man saying proudly, ‘I am a 
citizen’ and meaning by that ‘I am the kind of person who is and ought to be an active 
participant in the important affairs of my society’ […] He demands from us respect.”17 If 
we remember in Arendt’s analysis that, for the Greeks public life was the crux of all 
living activity towards which there was no greater purpose, the emotion of pride may be 
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easily understood. It is exemplified in their use of lot to guarantee each citizen’s service 
in a public position and the short tenure for those positions, so that each one would serve 
the body as a whole and not be allowed to occupy any position long enough to serve 
personal interests. The Greeks leveed fines for inattendance and strongly believed that the 
greatest function of the city-state was justice, in that it served to make men good. The 
Greek ideal of citizenship was pride in participation. Roelofs supports this saying, “unlike 
the subject, and the kingdom to which subjects must be loyal, the citizen seeks not only to 
be a member of his community but also to make it especially his own by sharing in its 
government.”18 
This not to say that citizenship, for many, does not connote a feeling of loyalty. 
Especially at times when one would consider their nation to be under threat, citizens 
perceive a call to action and submit themselves in service to the state. This cannot be said 
to stem from motivations of pride, rather it must be loyalty. It is true from the simple fact 
that because citizens are prideful members of their community and they jealously hold 
their status as citizens, that the service they volunteer would be very different from the 
type of service of other members of the community, such as slaves or aliens. Roelofs 
proves the point well saying, “the slave must serve always and without question. The 
subject must be dutiful. And the alien may well do only that which is specifically 
required of him by the authorities, and no more.”19 Only a citizen can truly display 
loyalty to the community, because only he can freely volunteer in his choice to serve. 
Roelofs believes that the meaning of loyalty conferred to our idea of citizenship 
comes from our civic heritage in the Hebrew nation. It is well known that the first 
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Americans largely chose to settle there because they sought religious freedom. So a 
Christian, and thereby Hebrew, ethic was passed along through Western history and 
became implanted in the social values of most Americans. Roelofs notes that “the 
Hebrew contribution to modern social theory, especially to the modern democratic 
conception of the citizen, is immense.”20 It is important to remember, while the ideas and 
morals passed on to us are part of this immense contribution, they are not explained 
explicitly as those in translations of Greek texts, rather they are found mostly in readings 
of the Old Testament.
21
 
Professor Roelofs begins his assessment of the Hebrew contribution to citizenship 
by providing an understanding of the Hebrew culture in its original context. He shares 
that the Hebrews viewed every idea or object as a totality, exemplifying the word 
“nephesh” which translated can mean “man”, “soul”, “body”, “character”, “appearance”, 
or “experience.” When the Hebrews used the word, they meant any and all of these 
concepts at once. All of this is to show that a concept of community for the Hebrews was 
viewed, in its own time, as a whole; a Hebrew man, the Hebrew nation, Hebrew law, 
religion, and God all existed at once, as one concept. From this we can gather that all of 
the “Thou’s” of the Ten Commandments do not necessarily refer to individual actions 
but, instead command a whole community. This community was, as characterized by its 
own people, chosen by their own god; Yahweh. They, believing themselves to be the 
chosen people, entered into an enduring covenant which “placed upon them an enduring 
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burden of rights and duties, of service.”22 Thus in the Hebraic community one became 
and remained a citizen as long as he remained loyal to the covenant that defined them. 
If, in our description of citizenship, citizens can choose to loyally volunteer their 
service, they ought to also be able to decline submitting themselves to service. If a 
citizen’s pride in his citizenship, rather than affirmatively joining in the voluntary 
sacrifice of some private interest, instead causes him to reel and turn away from the 
authority of the community, he will have defied the pressures of a relationship with the 
community in order to keep some portion of sovereign authority for himself. “Defiantly, 
he is proclaiming the viability and sufficiency of himself.”23 This defiance makes up the 
third part of Roelofs’ triad of meaning in the word Citizenship. He believes that it stems 
from individuality that arose in the Roman-Christian world and thus defiance was also 
passed through history and political thought into the Western concept of citizenship. 
Because of the massive expanse of the empire, and the fact that all free persons 
were citizens in Ancient Rome, those who lived among the communities of its periphery, 
communities enveloped by the empire, were stripped of their local citizenship and 
became subject to a government that was very far away. This distance could be 
characterized not only by physical separation, but also cultural separation. The societal 
and political trends within in the increasingly Christian empire very much isolated 
individuals from any communal ideals or objectives that we can more easily point to in 
our Greek or Hebraic examples.  
Drawing inspiration from Roman politics, American society created its own 
republic, modeling its government in similar fashion, and conveying ideas of the ideal 
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citizen. This was a citizen who lived a dual life, in part loyal to a far-away governing 
authority, and in part loyal to more personal and nearer aspirations. It was a citizen who 
sent a representative to appear and secure his interests in government so that he may 
contend with his private interests. The founders undoubtedly imagined their ideal citizen 
to be of the same group of people who heard the teachings in The Sermon on the Mount, 
that  
when thou prayest, thou shalt not be as hypocrites. For they love to pray standing 
in the synagogues and on the corners of the streets, that they may be seen by 
men. Verily, I say to you, they have their reward. But thou, when thou prayest, 
enter into thy closet, and when thou hast shut thy door, pray to thy Father in 
secret; and thy Father who sees in secret shall reward thee openly.
24
 
Knowing that they shared a culture of fervent religious freedom, the founders designed a 
government where the influence of authority was limited, so that each man could live 
how he believed God had willed him to. And, they imagined citizens who took an interest 
in their community, remained loyal to those whom they would call their brethren, and, 
through the benefits of this organized community, could establish and maintain those 
individual and private aspirations. In Roelofs’ conclusion a Western Democracy is made 
up of citizens who seek to balance these three demands; pride in participation, loyalty in 
service, and privacy in defiance. Privacy is then understood to be, not only a fundamental 
part of human life, but also a fundamental part of citizenship in a Democratic nation.  
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 The American Liberal Perspective 
Thus far we have examined privacy in what it meant at its foundation, in the 
earliest forms of Western society. We have seen in what ways privacy became a 
fundamental part of human life and a part of citizenship in a nation. A differing 
perspective can be found the early period of American society. 
In its inception, America gained from the liberalism of its founding ideals a 
unique form of individualism. This is evidenced blatantly in The Declaration of 
Independence.  
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; that among these 
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed.
1
 
This Lockean declaration established a new form of government that would be built upon 
consensual agreements made by equal individuals and would go no further. America’s 
classical liberals envisioned a society of truly private individuals, individuals who were 
the proprietors of their own being, their own will, and independent of any other persons 
or any claims to authority over them, and could join together in a public when the 
common interest that they each shared in protecting their own private lives necessitated 
cooperation. This individual spirit lasted throughout the first century of the nation’s 
existence. It is the cause for most every declaration of what the state shall not do in the 
Bill of Rights; an American’s last line of defense of his own private life. 
 The classical liberalism which lead to an American lifestyle that was suited 
towards private interests did not last long into the twentieth century. The Great 
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Depression killed it. From this defining event in American history the point was proved 
in spectacular form that one’s private acts to serve private occupations must be justified 
by their effects on society. It became quite clear that society’s pressures in the 
increasingly modern world would not maintain “the tension between public and private.”2 
Thus in American society the meaning of privacy withered so that it was kept as an 
important part of human life but held far less value in terms of citizenship in the nation. 
 Failing to maintain the tension between public and private after the great 
depression, society in the US has gradually shrunk an individual’s realm of privacy out of 
fear of the effects of his private aspirations. As Charles and Gregory Fried state, “a fear 
here cuts both ways: a fear of persons and a fear of governments.”3 This simplifying 
statement reveals an American society that has shifted its perspective, from a once great 
fear of over-bearing government, to a biocular inspection of both over-bearing 
government and misbehaving neighbors. In their book, Because It Is Wrong, Fried and 
Fried defend a thesis that invasions of privacy are morally wrong, although not absolutely 
wrong. By this they mean that in some cases invasions of privacy may be justifiable if a 
person’s loss or injury in the invasion is outweighed by a greater risk or danger to 
society. The defense of this thesis and common support for it requires a very tightly knit 
moral argument, an argument that, in their book, focuses entirely on how invasions of 
privacy offend the individual.  
 Fried and Fried argue that the core of privacy interests are two separate claims. 
“One is the concern about how […] information will be used to threaten other interests 
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[…] second is what might be called pure privacy interest.”4 To clarify, in their view, 
invasions of privacy are morally wrong because revealing information that is normally 
protected by privacy leaves an individual vulnerable to threats of other interests, and 
because acts insecuring that information are injurious to the individual in and of 
themselves. These views, while certainly a strong defense of individual privacy, are 
focused mostly on the negative outcomes for one person. They tend to examine how 
individual privacy makes us feel and how we can use privacy to protect other private 
interests. Their arguments ultimately fail to defend an idea of a government or a 
community that cherishes its respect for privacy and sees the right to privacy as an 
essential characteristic of a society.
5
  
 The point that privacy came to be valued only in terms of its function for 
individual men, but no longer citizens, in the United States is supported by a reading of 
the language used by the Supreme Court in landmark decisions about privacy. We can 
see that in many cases in which the court is asked to interpret privacy rights, they are 
entirely focused on what privacy means to the individual, rather than what privacy means 
to a Democratic form of government. For example, the Court in Union Pacific Railway 
Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891), referred to the individual’s right to the possession 
and control of his own person, stating,  
The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compulsory stripping and 
exposure as by a blow. To compel anyone, and especially a woman, to lay bare 
the body or to submit it to the touch of a stranger without lawful authority is an 
indignity, an assault, and a trespass, and no order of process commanding such an 
exposure or submission was ever known to the common law in the administration 
of justice.
6
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Nowhere in this case do the Justices refer to the consequences of law that would ensue 
had they decided in favor of the appellant here; consequences that would serve to make 
powers for the Court that are capable of enslaving the faculties of the citizen. The law 
would then serve to violate the most fundamental of liberties upon which American 
democracy was founded, making any citizen subject to physical intrusion of the body and 
person by government authority, and elevate the authority of the state to a degree 
equivalent to totalitarianism.  
 The point may be examined further in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, a 
case in which the Justices decided that the various guarantees of the Bill of Rights “create 
zones of privacy.”7 In this case the majority opinion calls great attention to Justice 
Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, but is more reserved in referencing 
Justice Douglas’ dissent from the same case. The former of these opinions finds 
contention in the laws effect on the liberties of the individual, and the latter finds 
contention in the outcomes of the law for the American form of government. Contrast the 
first opinion, Justice Harlan’s, which is recorded to have greatly affected the concurrence 
in Griswold, with the second, Justice Douglas’, hardly referenced in the recording of the 
case. 
1. “…it must be acknowledged that there is another sense in which it could be 
argued that this intrusion on privacy differs from what the Fourth Amendment, 
and the similar concept of the Fourteenth, were intended to protect; here we have 
not an intrusion into the home so much as on the life which characteristically has 
its place in the home. But to my mind such a distinction is so insubstantial as to 
be captious; if the physical curtilage of the home is protected, it is surely as a 
result of solicitude to protect the privacies of the life within.”8 
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2. “The regime of a free society needs room for vast experimentation. Crises, 
emergencies, experience at the individual and community levels produce new 
insights; problems emerge in new dimensions; needs, once never imagined, 
appear. To stop experimentation and the testing of new decrees and controls is to 
deprive society of a needed versatility. Yet to say that a legislature may do 
anything not within a specific guarantee of the Constitution may be as crippling 
to a free society as to allow it to override specific guarantees so long as what it 
does fails to shock the sensibilities of a majority of the Court.”9 
Again, using the Court as a mouth piece to describe the collective morality of American 
society, these references support the point that privacy came to be valued only in terms of 
its function for the individual, but no longer for the citizen. On these grounds, we must 
ask to what purpose or function does privacy serve for an individual human being? 
 In his seminal book, Privacy and Freedom, Alan Westin, Professor Emeritus of 
Public Law & Government at Columbia University, describes “The Functions of 
Individual Privacy.”10 In his view, man’s privacy serves four overlapping functions. The 
first is “Personal Autonomy”, which is described as man’s need for maintaining social 
processes that safeguard his individuality and protect him from manipulation and 
domination. Westin reports that privacy is believed to protect an individual’s personal 
autonomy by hiding their most intimate secrets and personality. Without privacy, Westin 
states, a man is left “naked to ridicule and shame and would [be] under the control of 
those who knew his secrets.”11 The existence of manipulation through invasions of one’s 
privacy is the greatest threat to self-ownership.  
 Westin’s second function of individual privacy is “Emotional Release.” From this 
section we can gather that Westin believes, as the social scientists that he cites, when a 
man leaves his home in the morning and goes out into the world he immediately falls 
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under certain pressures to act in a certain way, to behave, and to fulfill the role that he has 
agreed to play in society; father, husband, employee, etc. Yet, as Westin provides, it is 
impossible for any man to go on playing one or any number of roles indefinitely, and, in 
light of this reality, privacy offers each of us a moment of respite, however brief, from 
daily social pressures. 
 His third function of privacy, Westin calls “Self-Evaluation.” Sensibly named, the 
self-evaluation function of privacy allows individuals to process large amounts of 
information and reflect upon how they will let the information affect their actions and 
thoughts. This private time is when many of us are most forward thinking, creative, 
reflective, and evaluative. For many of these intellectual processes, the presence of others 
is only inhibitive. 
 “Limited and Protected Communication” is the final function of privacy reported 
by Westin. Here, he tells us that privacy safeguards civilized life by allowing one to have 
confidences and shared intimacies. Privacy allows us to set necessary boundaries and 
cognitive separation between our most honest thoughts and feelings and who should be 
aware of them. Privacy essentially allows us to form relationships and maintain 
relationships in different forms and types. This is because all relationships are based on 
how close or far we set these boundaries, and what information and honest expression we 
allow others to observe.
12
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Each of Westin’s four functions of privacy is touched upon in some way by a 
widely cited edition of the journal Philosophy & Public Affairs from 1975. James 
Rachels, in his article in the journal, provides an eloquent defense of the limited and 
protected communication function of privacy. He says  
there is a close connection between our ability to control who has access to us 
and to information about us, and our ability to create and maintain different sorts 
of social relationships with different people. According to this account, privacy is 
necessary if we are to maintain the variety of social relationships with other 
people that we want to have, and that is why it is important to us.
13
 
Again, this provides an account of the functions of privacy, showing why it is important 
for an individual’s human life and relationships and supports the necessity of privacy as a 
private concern. 
Rachels and the other authors who wrote in this issue of Philosophy & Public 
Affairs inspired a large response in their attempt to show exactly why privacy is 
considered to be so important. Rachels’ theory is that, as was stated, privacy is necessary 
and important in forming human relationships. One of the most widely cited responses to 
this theory is one that supports Westin’s first function of privacy; personal autonomy. 
In the article, titled Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, Jeffrey Reiman points out 
inadequacies in Rachels’ theory of privacy while supporting his own thesis that “privacy 
is a social ritual by means of which an individual’s moral title to his existence is 
conferred.” Reiman says that privacy is a necessary precondition of “personhood” or a 
concept of a “self.” This is because a person is believed to require autonomy, proof that 
the capacities of his body are entirely his and of his own volition. Without this proof 
there can be no person, no self. An individual denied it would have been enformed in a 
society of totalitarianism in the truest sense, a society “in which individuals do not own 
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their bodies.” 14 Autonomy, and social rituals respecting it, allow for the discovery of the 
necessary proof. Reiman offers the following example. 
As I sit among my friends, I know this body is mine because first of all, unlike 
any other body present, I believe – and my friends have acted and continue to act 
as if they believe – that I am entitled to do with this body what I wish. Secondly, 
but also essential, I know this body is mine because unlike any other body 
present, I have in the past taken it outside of the range of anyone’s experience but 
my own [privacy], I can do so now, and I expect to be able to do so in the 
future.
15
 
Some may try to shortcut this logic by simply acknowledging that a person’s body can 
only be their own because it houses only their consciousness. However, this view fails to 
recognize the loss of personhood that is inherent when a person loses ownership of their 
body, like in cases of imprisonment or enslavement, where individual consciousness is 
not interrupted; however, the volition over the capacities of one’s own body are subject 
entirely to outside forces. 
 With the understanding presented above, Justice Louis Brandies’ famous dissent 
in Olmstead takes on the full meaning that he would have conferred to a right to privacy. 
While this philosophy of privacy may seem fundamentally important, and while many of 
the philosophies reported in this section have been influential within several fields of 
academia, society at large has come to accept a far different notion of the importance of 
privacy. What American society thought of privacy in its beginnings is no longer held 
dear. What do Americans think of privacy now?
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The Contemporary Perspective 
“Who cares if they record internet activity? I have nothing to hide.” “Well I don’t 
really like the idea, but if it helps catch the bad guys…” These are common sentiments of 
the contemporary perspective of privacy. Many people are often pragmatic about the 
collection of their personal information or communications and trusting of governments 
and organizations to handle the balance of privacy with care and consideration. Judge 
Richard Posner is not shy about voicing his support for this pragmatism. As he says in 
person at a symposium held by the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, 
Trying to keep your passwords and social security number and all that secret, 
that’s protecting yourself entirely in a legitimate way. But much of what passes 
for the name of privacy is really just trying to conceal the disreputable parts of 
our conduct […] Privacy is mainly about trying to improve your social and 
business opportunities by concealing [some] sorts of bad activities.
1
 
His opinions expressed on the topic agree that individuals should have some degree of 
protected privacy, but Posner does not agree it confers upon individuals a concurrent 
right to seclusion or secrecy, rather he believes these are interests that are often 
counterbalanced. “I don’t see how it can outweigh national security concerns […] I think 
we glamorize privacy and are not realistic about what it’s really about […] I also think 
that privacy interests really should have very little weight when you’re talking about 
national security. The world is in an extremely turbulent state, very dangerous, and I 
think national security has transcendent significance.”2 Posner goes on to say that he 
believes it to be perfectly acceptable for the NSA to “vacuum” up all of the bits of 
information that are flowing through the internet because it serves the transcendent 
government interest of public safety. 
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As he said, Posner believes that we often times glamorize privacy and that it’s not 
as important as proponents might want it to seem. This is because the US Constitution 
does not protect what he considers to be legitimate privacy interests but rather interests 
that Americans have in “sexual and reproductive freedom.”3 Supporters of the 
contemporary view often support a similar conception to what Posner expresses as 
legitimate and illegitimate privacy concerns. In his book Not a Suicide Pact, Posner 
discusses what he considers to be two legitimate interests most people have in privacy. 
These are seclusion, meaning the freedom to go about one’s business without outside 
intervention, and secrecy, meaning freedom from the adverse effects of previously 
disclosed personal information. 
4
 
Despite his comments regarding the glamorization of privacy, Posner finds the 
form of privacy that creates seclusion to be legitimately important. Individuals need the 
freedom to communicate in private and to be able to communicate freely without 
intervention. “Solitude fosters individualistic attitudes; conversely, the constant presence 
of other people or the sense of being under constant surveillance enforces conformity.”5 
However, in his opinion our interest in national security and public safety heavily 
outweigh any individual’s interest in solitude. Posner also finds the form of privacy that 
creates secrecy to be legitimately important. This can be understood as the interest that 
we all have in keeping some things secret; bank account information, health records, the 
things we keep in our closets, etc. But he believes that these interests are even more 
easily outweighed by security concerns given the “blasé” manner with which many 
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people yield their personal information in modern society.
6
 It’s clear from his writing that 
Posner would prefer to designate these as privacy interests rather than rights.
7
 Interests 
are more easily arbitrated against. To call them rights would lend them more weight in an 
effort to balance privacy against security and safety concerns. The main argument of his 
book is that a society must be willing to accept curtailment of civil liberties in order for 
their government to effectively keep them safe.
8
 It is even easier to accept a curtailment 
of privacy if it is only regarded as a set of interests, rather than absolute rights. 
A curtailment of privacy, along with other interests or rights, is believed to greatly 
assist in combating terror and the most extreme forms of criminal activity. Posner refers 
to this as “altering the balance.”9 He and many other national security advocates believe 
that if citizens are not willing to yield some civil liberties to pressure, the doctrine 
supporting them may break. He offers a new balance of privacy interests as an example. 
I have said both that people value their informational privacy and that they 
surrender it at the drop of a hat. The paradox is resolved by noting that as long as 
people don’t expect that the details of their health, love life, or finances will be 
used to harm them in their interactions with other people, they are content to 
reveal those details to strangers when they derive benefits from the revelation. As 
long as intelligence personnel can be trusted to use their knowledge of such 
details only for the defense of the nation, the public will be compensated for the 
costs of diminished privacy in increased security from terrorist attacks.
10
 
In this pragmatic approach to addressing privacy concerns, privacy does not carry the 
same weight as it does in other perspectives. Additionally, the slight weight that is 
granted to privacy is fair based on how people are often thought to value their individual 
interests in privacy and private information, and what they do with it. 
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 Posner and those who support a pragmatic approach to addressing the balance of 
privacy issues hold that the sanction of state actions to surveille and collect information 
are the right decision because they do not violate anyone’s rights and because the public 
receives just compensation for the lost interest they have in privacy. His discussion of 
privacy concerns itself very little with possible invasion made by private entities, such as 
technology companies, internet service providers, and social networks. However, we can 
assume, based on the sentimentalities in his writing, that Judge Posner would consider 
many trespasses into areas of private information to be fair as long as those who were 
observed or surveilled were adequately compensated.  
 This assumption is supported by Posner’s proposed rebalancing of privacy 
interests above and a self-admittance in the belief that Courts and Judges are not really 
the best place to settle issues of privacy. In his opinion, neither is well equipped to make 
a fair decision in matters of information technology or privacy, and many of these matters 
are better off attempting a resolution before any question of justiciability arises.
11
 Thus, I 
believe we may assume that fair compensation, followed by continued use of a service or 
technology signals, to policy makers that share the same sentiments as Posner, a 
resolution to any qualms about privacy has arisen before legal authorities need become 
involved.  
 It is also supported by a closer look at how the pragmatic policy maker would 
view the functions of privacy for individuals in the modern world, especially when so 
much of our lives have become more and more connected online. It may seem that most 
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of us willingly allow private entities to eat away at the edges of our privacy. As observed 
by Criminal Justice Professor Keith Logan,  
When people are concerned about what the government may intercept when 
agencies gather digital data from the internet, they must first ask if that data 
is truly private. Let us consider some of the privacy we lose with our cell 
phones. First, we have service providers who have records of who we call, 
when we call, where we call, how long we call, and our basic finances. Then 
the providers cross reference all that information with data provided by other 
sources. Consider zip code demographics, home values, and the taxes we 
pay. We unwittingly agree to let the providers share a lot of information 
about us, usually because our knowing consent is lost in reading the 15 page 
contract for services.
12
 
 
There are areas of policy which currently parallel Logan’s reasoned appeal to a “realistic” 
approach to privacy concerns. One recent policy decision involves the collection of 
private information by internet service providers, or ISP’s.  
The congressional debate considered strict regulation by the FCC of ISP’s and 
removal of legal permissions to collect, aggregate, and sell private user information. The 
debate would ultimately lead to abandonment of the regulations.
13
 They were voted down 
by congress in large part because access to the private information of users helps to keep 
the costs of internet service low for customers.
14
A more simple explanation is to say that 
ISP’s were allowed this intrusion and use of the private information because those same 
users are continuously compensated with low-cost internet service. This is one example 
of the pragmatic approach to privacy issues that characterizes the Contemporary 
perspective of privacy. 
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Another good example is the collection of amendments that were made to 
California Senate Bill 1822 in 2004.
15
 The bill was originally proposed by Senator 
Figueroa of California in response to Google’s announcement of updates to their Gmail 
services. The new service allowed them to scan the content of their customer’s emails 
and send them links to relevant advertisements. While some found this to be a violation 
of privacy, akin to phone companies listening to phone calls, the bill was amended and 
passed with the understanding that the information would not be stored.     
If, in the perspective of the Contemporary understanding of privacy, the interest 
that one has in keeping private information secret can be outweighed by cheaper and 
more convenient information technology services, like ads marketed specifically to you, 
then those interests should be even more easily outweighed by a government that is 
concerned with guarding national security. As Judge Posner says in his book, “the 
government has a compelling need to exploit digitization” of personal information in 
order to increase security, because information “privacy is a terrorists best friend, and the 
terrorist’s privacy has been enhanced by the same technological developments that have 
made both data mining feasible and elicited vast quantities of personal information from 
innocents.”16 Former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft agrees with this for a 
persuasive reason. At a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, where questions 
were raised as to the infringement upon civil liberties by the PATRIOT Act, Ashcroft 
testified that “terrorists are told how to use America’s freedom as a weapon against us. 
They are instructed to use the benefits of a free press […] to exploit our judicial process 
[…] to lie about who they are, to lie about what they are doing […] to concoct stories of 
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torture and mistreatment […] to take advantage of any contact with the outside world.”17 
Both Ashcroft and Posner reflect on the fact that although everyone needs some measure 
of privacy and, although our principles of individual liberty and protection of private 
endeavors are what makes America distinct from most of the world, those same privacy 
protections also make us more vulnerable. 
There are people within the government who are faced with this inherent 
contradiction quite often, most notably the American Intelligence Community. For them, 
maintaining the balance between privacy interests and security is a constant struggle, and 
a struggle that is almost always evolving based on growing and changing threats. Many 
believe that the increased threat that exists, in an age when one man can take the lives of 
thousands, requires extraordinary preventative measures. According to John Ashcroft, the 
American Intelligence Community required severe overhaul to keep up with the threats 
that now exist in the modern world, and the events of September 11
th
 made spectacularly 
clear the veracity of that claim.
18 
However, those extraordinary measures are often criticized by the public who are 
not able to perceive the constant threats and are not privy to information regarding the 
successes of the intelligence community. Former NSA and CIA Director Michael Hayden 
has expressed the difficulty experienced by those whom are tasked with keeping America 
safe.
 “American political elites feel very empowered to criticize the American 
intelligence community for not doing enough when they feel endangered, and as soon as 
we’ve made them feel safe again, they feel equally empowered to complain that we’re 
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doing too much.”19 General Hayden perceived the criticisms of the Joint Inquiry 
Commission prior to 9/11 to be condemning of the NSA. Failures to “connect the dots”20 
were believed to be caused by “gaps in the NSA’s coverage of foreign communications 
and the FBI’s coverage of domestic communications.”21 As a result of those criticisms 
Hayden and others working in intelligence developed what was considered to be a 
“logical response.”22 The surveillance programs that followed would be far more 
aggressive and admittedly closer to crossing the line of legality.
23 
 The aggressiveness of surveillance tactics has led to criticism from the public and 
members of congress and led to whistleblowing within agencies like the NSA. However, 
those who support these tactics believe that they are justified and also that they are not as 
aggressive as they could be.
24
 Champions of the surveillance tactics, like General Hayden 
believe that they have a more than saving grace and that they are actually morally 
laudable. 
Using computers and bots to collect and surveille all data and communications 
without human interference is thought to be the best way to find threats. The automated 
systems signal to human analysts without providing identifying information. If it is 
determined that the communication is irrelevant, the data is deleted, leaving the 
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individual anonymous and their privacy intact.
25
 Hayden and others have touted the 
NSA’s ability to prevent attacks and keep people safe using this useful tool. 
Likewise, private information technology companies have used similar tools in 
the past to provide better services. In a meeting with California State Senator Figueroa, 
Google executive Sergey Brin provided an explanation of Google’s email tool, which 
reads what users type, and provides ads and links that are relevant to the conversation. 
The tool is analogized to “a robot [that] went into your home and read your diary and 
read your financial records, read your love letters, read everything, but before leaving the 
house, it imploded. That’s not violating privacy… nothings kept. Nobody knows about 
it.”26 Presumably while the robot was in your home it was providing useful services with 
the information that it had found. 
Surveillance and information collection tools, such as those used by the NSA and 
Google, allow those entities to have more information and to know more about us than 
any other information collection effort in history. The ability to know so much has been 
granted by to the growth of two separate impending forces, the social pressure that 
pushes modern society to put so much stock into online interaction, and the increasing 
threat of massive damage to a nation at the hands of a terrorist. As Judge Posner puts it, 
the environment has changed.
27
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CHAPTER 4.    EVALUATING CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES 
Many cases and issues that arise throughout the course of our human experience 
require cooperation or the formation of a government and many of those issues 
necessitate the creation of a policy area that governs privacy. Each imponderable event 
differs in the amount of privacy that is necessary. There are also issues where too much 
privacy is dangerous. Examples may include the regulation of pornography for 
considerations of decency, preemption of political speech for considerations of 
threatening or radical ideas, and surveillance of conspiratorial activity for consideration 
of criminal or terrorist activity. When faced with questions such as these, a society may 
need to view privacy from a different perspective. The perspectives of privacy reported 
here each give deference to privacy, either as an important interest, or as an intrinsic 
right.  Although they each value privacy, the perspectives differ in the value they ascribe 
to it, and for different reasons. 
Now that we have a better definition and understanding of each perspective of 
privacy issues, we can analyze and evaluate each one. The perspectives each have 
arguments for and against, and different goals for the society that they ultimately strive to 
achieve. These can be the most individualistic society, the most cooperative society, the 
most safe society, or any number of goals. In order to evaluate each of our three 
perspectives of privacy one ought to compare the advantages and disadvantages that arise 
from utilizing each one and their goals. Let’s begin with the American Liberal 
perspective. 
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For the American Liberal, protection of individual autonomy and liberty is the 
primary concern. This is clear from Westin’s “Functions of Individual Privacy.” A 
society that values privacy for the purpose of protecting the liberty of the individual, 
would also “protect him from manipulation and domination.” In this sense, it is probably 
the perspective that leads to what we would imagine as the most freedom. Every issue 
viewed through the American Liberal perspective would permit the individual, to the 
greatest extent possible, to maintain and manipulate the information society knows about 
them. The information that makes up their personality, their characteristics, their 
reputation, and their secrets would be owned, and majority controlled by that individual.  
More privacy protections would mean fewer pressures from society, and less 
shame and anxiety about behavior and expression. Time not spent in the public would be 
time spent in complete domination of one’s own actions, behavior, and thoughts, no 
matter how absurd they may seem. There are many simple examples to explain this idea. 
Rachels chooses to illustrate it in his article using an excerpt from John Barth’s novel The 
End of the Road.  
The narrator of the story, Jake Homer, is with Joe Morgan's wife, Rennie, 
and they are approaching the Morgan house where Joe is at home alone: 
"Want to eavesdrop?" I whispered impulsively to Rennie. "Come on, it's 
great! See the animals in their natural habitat." 
Rennie looked shocked. "What for?" 
"You mean you never spy on people when they're alone? It's wonderful 
Come on, be a sneak! It's the most unfair thing you can do to a person." 
"You disgust me, Jake!" Rennie hissed. "He's just reading. You don't know 
Joe at all, do you?" 
"What does that mean?" 
"Real people aren't any different when they're alone. No masks. What you 
see of them is authentic." 
.... Quite reluctantly, she came over to the window and peeped in beside 
me. 
It is indeed the grossest of injustices to observe a person who believes 
himself to be alone. Joe Morgan, back from his Boy Scout meeting, had 
evidently intended to do some reading, for there were books lying open on 
the writing table and on the floor beside the bookcase. But Joe wasn't 
45 
reading. He was standing in the exact center of the bare room, fully dressed, 
smartly executing military commands. About face! Right dress! 'Ten-shun! 
Parade rest! He saluted briskly, his cheeks blown out and his tongue 
extended, and then proceeded to cavort about the room-spinning, pirouetting, 
bowing, leaping, kicking. I watched entranced by his performance, for I 
cannot say that in my strangest moments (and a bachelor has strange ones) I 
have surpassed him. Rennie trembled from head to foot.
1
 
 
A society with an American Liberal perspective of privacy would make it very dangerous 
to invade someone’s privacy in the way described and even more dangerous to share 
anything that was seen. Thus, any person would feel free to act and express themselves in 
their behavior and feel no shame in their private actions because of the knowledge that 
the rules of their society protect them from unwanted observation, as well as 
embarrassment and shame. 
In a similar way, our thoughts and opinions would be less available for public 
scrutiny and leave more availability to self-evaluation. One example is more individual 
freedom, and simultaneously less social pressure, to evaluate and form political and 
ideological beliefs. Each person would be left to themselves to decide their political 
preferences, if they want to be communistic, fascist, democratic, racist, tolerant, socially 
conservative, fiscally liberal, and militaristic, their religiousness, orthodox, progressive, 
or atheistic, and which groups they want to be a part of; unions, church groups, clans, or 
book clubs. In the American Liberal perspective each person would be free to take on or 
shirk a greater number of roles that we each play in society, and additional privacy 
protections leaves more decisions about appropriate behavior up to the individual.
 
Less 
pressure from society and more opportunities for introspective thought leads to a greater 
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diversity of ideas and more honest expression of opinions. 
 
As John Stuart Mill knew in 
1859,  
society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong 
mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it 
ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny more formidable than many 
kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such 
extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more 
deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.
2
 
 
Thoughts and behavior in any of life’s circumstances, free of societal pressures, lend 
great weight to a person’s own perceptions of morality in their choices. These societal 
pressures challenge our roles and choices, from our choice of occupation, to family 
planning choices, to the propriety of a piece of art.  
This same control over who, how, and when, others may scrutinize or even know 
about information about us, would allow us to customize and manipulate how meaningful 
our relationships are with others; how honest they are, how real they are. “The man who 
is generous with his possessions, but not with himself, can hardly be a friend, nor – and 
this more clearly shows the necessity of privacy for love – can the man, who either 
voluntarily or involuntarily, shares everything about himself with the world 
indiscriminately.”3 Thus in a society that maintained the American Liberal perspective as 
socially valuable, personal relationships would be less public, and may, for that reason, 
be more intimate. And, the individuals in that society would feel less pressure from the 
possible consequences from revealing acts of what others would call indecency or 
inappropriate. 
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The 2015 film Welcome to Me probes the personal dangers of over-publicizing 
relationships. The main character, Alice, has a difficult personality disorder, 86 million 
dollars that she has just won from the lottery, and dreams of having her own TV show. 
While Alice is perfectly comfortable revealing every detail of her personal life to an 
audience, the friends and family she extemporaneously interviews on her show are not.  
The film illustrates the self-obsessed, and ultimately isolating, world of someone who 
lives their entire life with an audience. As Alice’s mother tells her in one of her 
interviews, “not everyone is an emotional exhibitionist.”4 A society that has a greater 
respect for privacy allows interpersonal relationships to flourish and values the real 
connections that are required for those relationships over the interceding mediums of the 
digital age. 
A society with this perspective of  privacy would also likely foster support for 
economic competition and innovation through the greatest protections of individual, 
private aspirations. It’s no coincidence that the society that valued this perspective the 
most is characterized by the laissez-faire economics of pre-industrial America and 
extreme protectionism in its foreign affairs. The ethic of individualism inherent in 
newborn Capitalism meshed well with the ethic of individualism inherent in American 
Protestantism. Their values mutually reinforced each other in a purposefully logical 
manner: humility is to thrift, as service is to hard work, as predestination is to financial 
success in a very unpredictable market. “…the freedom of the market place was chiefly 
valuable as providing opportunity for each man to test the moral fiber of his soul. Money 
was success, but this was no crass materialism, for success was a victory of the spirit.”5 
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Conversely, a society that feared this unpredictability in the market, or sought to coerce 
certain outcomes in the market for the benefit of societal goals, would place greater 
restrictions on business practices, subsidize and reward acceptable endeavors, and even 
outright ban some types of business. A society’s perception about the public effects of 
individual enterprise might cause it to prohibit a farmer from growing a certain amount of 
crops on his own land
6
, or provide bailouts and subsidies to an automobile manufacturer 
to keep it afloat, or ban the production and sale of liquor.  
If a community were to hold the value of privacy in the manner described by the 
American Liberal, it would attract individuals from other communities who may feel that 
there is too much intrusion into their lives. Immigrating to an American Liberal type 
society may mean greater opportunities to practice controversial religious beliefs, to love 
whom you choose and how you choose, to express your artistic point of view, or chase 
your entrepreneurial dreams. 
An American Liberal perspective of privacy does have disadvantages, however. 
Greater individual freedom to make one’s own choices without societal or governmental 
pressures leads to a great amount of uncertainty. Just as the uncertainty of the free-market 
in laissez-faire economies led to the unpredictable booms and busts of the early 20
th
 
century, political and ideological beliefs, left unchecked by social pressures, may become 
dangerously radical. Increased privacy inherently means more secrecy amongst 
individuals and a greater difficulty in trusting your neighbor.  
As human beings, our sense of security is entirely subjective. The things that 
make us feel secure in our homes, and in our persons, differ from person to person. Some 
feel more secure with a second lock on their door, some feel more secure when carrying a 
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firearm, and some feel the most secure when they are with friends. Nevertheless, one 
thing that makes everyone feel more secure is increased knowledge about possible 
threats. In a society of great individual freedom and the most respect for individual 
privacy, knowledge about the beliefs and intentions of others is at its lowest. 
Much of the uncertainty present in a society that values privacy from this 
perspective is caused by the respect for freedoms that stand in direct opposition to what 
are considered the police powers of the state. In this society, an individual would be free 
to think and act as they please and the state’s power to legislate those freedoms would be 
extremely limited, enfeebled. The State may be barred from intervening in most cases of 
private affairs except “where property may be destroyed to arrest a conflagration or the 
ravages of pestilence, or be taken under the pressure of an immediate and overwhelming 
necessity to prevent a public calamity.”7 With so much of an individual’s privacy 
protected, they are free to write radical political pamphlets, organize demonstrations, 
advocate racism, compose a lewd book on sex, personally identify with a gender of their 
choosing, amass a stockpile of firearms, or preach the supremacy Sharia Law. 
This uncertainty about the lives and intentions of our neighbors is the direct target 
of many advocates of the Contemporary perspective of privacy. For the society that views 
privacy issues with this Contemporary perspective, attaining and analyzing the most 
information is the primary concern. As was concluded in the review of the literature 
surrounding this perspective, having the most information available is paramount for two 
reasons. First, having the most information reduces uncertainty regarding potential threats 
to a community and its society. More information helps to delineate serious threats from 
idle ones, and it helps to identify the source of the threat and often to identify the best 
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preemption or response. Second, having the most information increases the efficiency 
and quality of goods and services. Better and more detailed information about the online 
interactions of consumers has led to a rapid revolution in almost every corner of 
commerce and enterprise. 
It is important not to forget the seriousness of the possible threats to modern 
societies and the significance of more information in protecting people from those 
threats. Do not allow the first reasoned support of the Contemporary view to be undercut 
by an assumed triviality of the second. The airline hijackings that took place on 
September 11, 2001 were committed by a group of 19 individuals and resulted in the 
deaths of nearly 3,000 Americans. The attack also transformed national security policy in 
the United States, which found the greatest fault in its own severe lack of information.
8
 
A society that holds the Contemporary view would value some aspects of 
individual privacy but believes that its value to individuals within the society can 
essentially be paid off through efficient and effective services, either from the state or 
from private corporations. Concomitantly, the individuals in this society that wished to 
volunteer or monetize their own personal information would find it easy to do so. This is 
indicative of the relative importance of information over privacy in the Contemporary 
view. More information helps individuals get what they want faster. In the post 9/11 
world, what we often want is a sense of security. Terrorism, crime, disease, cyber 
espionage are all very real and present threats.  
 If a society were to view privacy issues from the Contemporary perspective, it 
would likely be the most prepared to provide an answer to these security threats, thereby 
ensuring the continued survival of that society. This society would likely rely on its 
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institutions to responsibly use the information provided and address popular concerns. 
Relinquished medical information would enable better responses to possible epidemics 
and cures for serious disease. More easily accessible information about privately owned 
weapons, and volatile substances would allow a society to better analyze the possible 
sources of catastrophic events. Crime and Terrorism are often effectively quelled by 
delving into financial information, and attacks on information technology infrastructure 
necessitate information regarding its traffic and practices.  
 The perception of a major threat to society can cause many to wish to volunteer 
these types of information, and, over time, become more comfortable with doing so if 
they believe the information is used responsibly to address the threat. This reaction also 
has a propensity to indirectly cause social pressures that enforce cooperation.
9
 The 
presence of a major security threat causes a society to be far less tolerant of subversion 
and differing politics. The Contemporary perspective emphasizes the importance of 
cooperation, conformity, and loyalty, especially in response to threats. 
 Posner, and others of the Contemporary perspective, remind us that, in the 
modern world, we are so rarely alone, either in our conversations or in what may be 
considered private affairs, even in our own homes. The sense of security we often get 
from having someone or something watch over us, leads to a compulsion to welcome 
with open arms many novel forms of surveillance. In this society we become complacent 
in the complete absence of solitude. 
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[…] publicity, not merely as a curb on the arrogance of [the ruling class] but 
as a condition in which the members of society are brought into a maximum 
of contact with each other. Favoring the exposure of practically every aspect 
of life, it is uneasy in the presence of those who appear to be withholding 
something. It is not always tolerant, and its occasional intolerance derives in 
large part from the alarm over folds and convolutions in the fabric of society 
in which might lie hidden unknown dangers, temptations and disruptions.
10
 
 
The social pressures of modern society and the digital age create a maximum of 
interconnectedness of everyone’s entirely personal issues, even if the connections are 
only superficial. Having a viewership or interested observance, however shallow, then 
becomes valued, because it is trendy, because it can be paid for by new and flashy apps, 
and because it makes us feel safe. Thus, the constant presence of surveillance, 
government or otherwise, not only has a strong precedent, but it is gratefully accepted as 
a perfectly normal compulsion to be involved in another’s personal affairs. The only 
difference between Barth’s snooping character Jake Homer, and an officer of the Stasi 
secret police, is that one has been granted permission by the government. 
A society that is comfortable in the Contemporary perspective of privacy, values 
privacy the least. Furthermore, there is a more palpable risk to individuals in a society 
that accepts the Contemporary perspective as the norm. In our review of the literature 
surrounding this perspective we learn that citizens yield a great amount of information to 
authorities in exchange for security. However, this exchange only remains beneficial to 
both sides “as long as intelligence personnel can be trusted.”11 The propensity for an 
abuse of power once authorities have permission to carry out tactics of surveillance and 
intelligence gathering is not only entirely possible but has happened several times in the 
history of the United States. The most notable cases include the Justice Department’s 
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treatment of members of the IWW in the early part of the 20
th
 century
12
, illegal 
wiretapping of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
13
, and illegal operations carried out by the CIA 
to surveille and monitor members of the press and people who were opposed to the war in 
Vietnam, published in the New York Times’ Family Jewels reports14.  
Wrongful or irresponsible use of information gathering powers entrusted to a 
large institution is not unique to government authorities either. Many private 
organizations that were once highly trusted have been found acting egregiously 
irresponsible with private information. Examples of this could be the Equifax scandal
15
, 
or the novel trend in the software and mobile application industry to use “opaque 
language” in user agreements.16 Entrusting any institution, public or private, with 
personal information is a large risk, especially in the digital age, when the information 
environment changes rapidly and security is never assured. As professor Xiaxing Xi 
agonizingly recalls, “I was charged for things that were just normal collaborations. If all 
these normal activities could be seen as criminal activities, then the environment is quite 
frightening.”17 
 Our analysis of the two perspectives addressed thus far illustrates how they exist 
at either end of the privacy spectrum. The Contemporary perspective takes a hard stance 
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on the necessity of information to protect communities from emerging threats, and the 
American Liberal perspective denies that there is any greater purpose other than the 
protection of individual liberties.  In essence, each perspective is simply a greater 
elaboration on the traditional privacy vs. security debate, and it seems we may have come 
full circle. However, there is one final perspective of privacy issues upon which we can 
further elaborate. Perhaps the Participatory Democratic perspective presents a 
compromise between the other two perspectives, an escape from a choice between the 
lesser of two evils. 
 In the Participatory Democratic perspective, the goal is to create a society that 
fosters a vibrant and diverse public realm. Through a better understanding of the 
foundational ideals of Western society and a modern application of those ideals to current 
politics, the Participatory Democratic society would create a space for public action. It 
would honor a citizen’s contribution to the nation above all else. 
 In order for this society to reach its noble goal, it would likely make stark 
distinctions between which parts of human life belong in the public and which parts 
belong in the private. Strict normative rules regarding public and private life are 
necessary in order to prevent decay of the private realm and a loss of the individual 
perspectives that are necessary for the vibrant public that the society strives to protect. 
This is because individual perspectives and the sharing of opinions, the essence of 
politics itself, are what constitute a “plurality of men”. “In the experience of the polis, 
which not without justification has been called the most talkative of all bodies politic […] 
to be political, to live in a polis, meant that everything was decided through words and 
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persuasion.”18 Without this plurality, there is no space for action or distinction in the 
public realm and all attempts at such would be lost in the swallowing banality of mass 
society. 
Individuality is a necessity for the condition of plurality, “the condition of human 
action because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the 
same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live.” The idea of plurality as a 
requisite of politics is an appeal made by Arendt to the longstanding philosophy of the 
marketplace of ideas.  
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may 
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their 
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground 
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
19
 
 
If we are to fill the marketplace, as it were, with competing ideas, each vying for 
acceptance, we need a private realm free of manipulation; free to create and think at 
freewill, a space to observe the world through a lens unclouded by another’s eye.  
The main point of contention for the Participatory Democratic perspective is that 
it does not value the increasingly social parts of modern mass society. The perspective of 
privacy is antithetical to a social realm that bleeds into and amongst what was 
traditionally considered public or private. Arendt’s perception of the modern world is one 
in which we have blurred the lines between the public and the private realm, shrunk those 
realms to the point that they are no longer identifiable, and now live most of our lives in 
an increasingly social world. A social world filled with pressures and subconscious 
manipulation of ideas and their expression. Brought on by a loss of individuality that is 
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slowly swallowed by mass society, the social realm may be described as a growing 
infatuation with consumable wealth, “the absorption of the family unit into corresponding 
social groups,” an expansion of government into Bureaucracy, “the most social form of 
government,” and an exclusion of the possibility for independent human action.20  
This obvious account of society can be observed in our daily conditions, when we 
embark the train for our daily commute, a once bustling and energetic opportunity for 
interaction, we can now experience the serene, uninterrupted, rhythmic sound of nothing 
more than the shuffling of feet. We rehearse the current political formula that has shrunk 
all individual perspectives into one of two boxes and ardently precludes any social 
disagreement.
21
 And the media, once the grand source of information needed for the 
formulation of relevant and plural opinion, is now the source of a singular mind-interning 
sermon of the one and only truth. 
We live amongst a singular mass society that inspires simply nothing but 
complete conformism. We became “social beings and unanimously followed certain 
patterns of behavior,” “those who did not keep the rules could be considered to be asocial 
or abnormal.”22 The Participatory Democratic perspective holds dear the necessary 
components of human action, the doing of great deeds, and so as a society must respect 
and protect the conditions that allow us to create a plurality of men. 
Acts of invasion or surveillance then stand in opposition to this protection of the 
private realm in that they batter down the door of our private world, grab hold of our 
individuality by the nape, as a castigating father to a child, and drag it out into the searing 
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light of publicity. Similarly, the knowledge of a continued policy of surveillance serves 
only to intimidate any further acts of individuality, so that our behavior, in our most 
intimate moments, is restrained, chilled, and dispirited. Acts that invade privacy then, 
very much do constrain the individual liberty of the person and serve to do so even before 
those liberties could be conceived. As Mill once declared, "Our merely social intolerance 
kills no one, roots out no opinions, but induces men to disguise them, or to abstain from 
any active effort for their diffusion."
23
 
The necessity of respect for the private aspects of our lives is foundational in 
honoring the contributions that a truly political individual could make to their nation, the 
great deeds they could accomplish through pure politics. Without a private world to 
provide both a subjective and objective foundation, the public world loses it character of 
triumph over necessity and opportunity for true freedom. “A life spent entirely in the 
public, in the presence of others, becomes, as we would say, shallow. While it retains its 
visibility, it loses the quality of rising into sight from some darker ground which must 
remain hidden if it is not to lose its depth in a very real, non-subjective sense.”24 A 
society that ardently adopts the goal of a flourishing public realm recognizes the 
importance of the private. It would also recognize the importance of protecting the 
physical space and the lives of men that comprise the public realm. This perspective of 
understanding the necessary balance between security for the public and a respected 
private space means that Participatory Democratic perspective fits well in the middle of 
our privacy continuum.  
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 The unique goal of the Participatory Democratic society to dedicate itself to a 
flourishing public realm reflects a broad deference to privacy when compared to our 
other perspectives. It values individual privacy for different reasons than the American 
Liberal perspective, reasons that are less vain and more centered on public goals and the 
solidarity of a loyal community. Physical protection of the public space is recognized as a 
necessary requisite for the politics of a flourishing public realm. At times, drastic 
measures may be required in response to immense threats. This society’s dedication to 
the survival and continuation of the public would allow it to band together in times of 
crisis and voluntarily yield some privacy interests in defense of the whole. In fact, a 
public that functions true to Arendt’s model would likely contravene the compulsion to 
seek out national intelligence policies that strive to create a sense of security. A vibrant 
public realm filled with political interactions and unhindered expression would mean 
better interconnected relationships among members of the same community and less 
uncertainty. The easiest way to perceive the intentions of one’s neighbor is to go and talk 
to him, participate in your community alongside him, and engage him politically. 
Additionally, without a plurality of men dedicated to the lasting continuation of a 
vibrant public realm, there is no room left for citizens to express sincere loyalty to the 
nation that is truly theirs. As Roelofs reminds us, the citizen in a Participatory 
Democratic society “seeks not only to be a member of his community but also to make it 
especially his own by sharing in its government.” Loyalty to one’s own community is 
easier to perceive in a society that allows its citizens to make the choice between 
dedicating part of themselves to the public goals of the nation and refraining from 
participation. Loyalty to public goals is often impossible to perceive in the Contemporary 
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perspective, when citizens are compelled to participate in public programs, or worse, 
when the governing authority simply takes the information it needs and leaves its citizens 
oblivious. 
If the Participatory Democratic perspective has any disadvantages, one may be the 
extent of the public’s dedication to political participation in the society that the 
perspective ultimately hopes to achieve. Its citizens must be courageous enough to 
participate in a space that is inherently publicizing and to sacrifice some private interests 
in the name of cooperation. A society dedicated to each citizen’s life in the public would 
require immense cooperative effort and an equal sharing of that effort. This cooperation 
is less effective when participation is low. In a Participatory Democratic public, political 
engagement and acknowledgement of public interests are the most important 
foundational values. Broad recognition of those values in turn confers greater legitimacy 
to governing authorities. Such a government would truly be a government of the people. 
In order to create it, its people must be dedicated to participation. 
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CHAPTER 5.    CONCLUSION 
In the imponderable world of political affairs, questions of individual privacy will 
arise, and a society with the broadest perspective will be best equipped to understand and 
address the issue. A broad perspective of privacy allows a society to evaluate every side 
of the matter and come to political agreement about a proper response. Thus, the 
Participatory Democratic perspective of privacy is the best perspective that is analyzed 
here. The Participatory Democratic perspective offers more benefits to viewers of privacy 
issues and avoids the costs of the Contemporary perspective. 
During WWII, under the perception of immense threat of subversion and rebellion 
from Japanese-Americans. Those individuals were interned in “relocation centers” in 
California from the year 1942 to 1945. This created a sense of security for Americans at 
the great expense of a few. Modern American society is stuck in its Contemporary view 
of privacy issues, striving to create a sense of security. It values information for 
addressing threats to public safety over all other interests and it forces cooperation, rather 
than allowing for true loyalty, so that each citizen forcibly contributes to the preservation 
of the community unknowingly, and without consent. The United States has built up the 
arsenal of its intelligence apparatuses,
1
 provided impetus largely by the collapse of the 
World Trade Center and the instigation of the War on Terror. The nation, now infinitely 
more aware of the dangers that exist to its way of life, has lived the last 17 years in the 
scramble for a sense of security.  
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It was the case following September 11
th
, 2001 that Americans perceived a greater 
sense of security from their government because of the promises made by authorities to 
keep them safe and a palpable increase in measures of counterterrorism. It also continues 
to be the case that the new norm is a devaluation of privacy. This is seen in the adoption 
of similar valuations of privacy among private corporations. The commonality of 
government invasions of privacy has opened the door for technology producers and 
service industries to take a similar view. The marketplace of ideas in the United States 
has been diminished and is increasingly more hostile to diverse political thought. 
Government efforts to increase security are coercive and back handed.
2
 The outlook is far 
worse when considering the cause for viewing privacy issues through the Contemporary 
lens. America declared a war on terror, a nebulous concept to define, and a victory nearly 
impossible to imagine. If it is always on the lookout for threats of terrorism, a society will 
view issues of privacy from the Contemporary perspective indefinitely. The maintenance 
of this narrow perspective of privacy issues has led to social intolerance and a diminished 
public. 
At the outset of this investigation, I sought to identify the theoretical perspective 
that is best for evaluating issues of privacy. In analyzing the costs and benefits of each 
perspective we can conclude that the benefits of the Participatory Democratic perspective 
make it the best perspective of the three. The breadth of this perspective allows society 
the political flexibility to address any issues of privacy that arise, whether those issues 
implicate one individual, such as issues regarding the regulation of pornography, or entire 
nations, such as issues in eliminating funding for terrorist groups. Because the 
Participatory Democratic perspective views a diverse and flourishing public realm in the 
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highest regard, someone who maintains this perspective of privacy would not be forced to 
abandon it when severe threats to the public arise or when individuals begin to fear 
encroachment into their private lives. The same cannot be said for the other two 
perspectives of privacy.  
The Participatory Democratic perspective also lacks some of the severe 
detriments that are present in the other two perspectives. In comparison, the American 
Liberal perspective is far too focused on the positive aspects of privacy for the individual. 
While the best perspective of privacy ought to acknowledge the importance of privacy for 
the human beings, the American Liberal perspective fails to recognize the importance of 
privacy for the nation and also fails to recognize the growing danger that lurks in the 
uncertainty of life in a modern world; a world where technology and anonymity continue 
to grow in their capacity to wreak havoc and do real, physical harm in civilized society.  
On the other side of the debate, the Contemporary perspective severely 
underestimates the importance of privacy. This perspective views privacy as a threat and 
an impediment to public safety. It also fails to recognize the importance of deference to 
privacy in a Western Democracy. The ability for a society to adapt its deference to 
privacy in response to the issues that arise in the world of human affairs, allows it to 
address those specific issues appropriately. In the United States, a loss of flexibility in 
addressing privacy issues has been caused by a clenching of the severe weight of the 
threat of terrorism. The nation’s political affairs have failed to avoid binding doctrines 
that limit its perspective and its evaluation of the costs of the Contemporary perspective.  
Although this work has been limited in scope by the unavailability of information 
regarding national security, and the relative successes or failures of security policies in 
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effectively keeping Americans safe, we have been able to evaluate the perspective from 
which American society perceives privacy. If it can regain its balance, and adopt a 
different theoretical perspective of privacy, America may begin to recover from the 
detriments of prolonged perception from the Contemporary perspective. If it already had, 
we can conclude that things would be very different for Professor Xiaxing Xi and others 
like him. 
There are areas within this investigation that would benefit from further research. 
Being that there are only three differing perspectives outlined here, further identification 
and analysis of other perspectives would help to inform the conclusions made and may 
even change them drastically. Additionally, case studies into specific areas of privacy 
may reveal the effects of the perspectives and show, in greater detail, the benefits and 
detriments of adopting a particular perspective. Any future work that analyses different 
privacy perspectives will likely be informed by data and information that is made 
available by intelligence communities and so affected by the declassification and release 
of such information. Finally, this work has been limited by its author’s experience of 
conditions provided by the time and place in which it written.
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